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ABSTRACT
There is a widespread consensus that China’s growing network of regional
trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific has crucial strategic and economic impli-
cations for states in the region. Yet despite the recognition that China’s
agreements are initially limited and then expanded substantially over time,
few accounts explore the strategic and economic implications of this aspect
of China’s approach. This article addresses this flaw by drawing attention to
the relation between regional power dynamics and China’s gradualist
approach to negotiating regional trade agreements. It presents a new frame-
work which suggests that due to China’s steadily improving economic pos-
ition vis-a-vis its regional counterparts and the growing economic
dependence of these partners on it, China’s negotiating approach increases
opportunities to maximize its growing bargaining leverage and influence over
time and thereby improve its regional position still further. This article con-
cludes by drawing out the implications of this for the region.
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China and regional integration
In recent decades, economic integration in the Asia-Pacific has accelerated
markedly, with the expansion of regional production networks and supply
chains, the growth of regional multinationals and the intensification of
trade connections between countries in the region. The ratio of intra-
regional trade between East Asian countries alone has grown from around
25% in the 1960s to over 50% by the mid-2010s (Dent, 2017, p. 18). One of
the most important mechanisms by which this has occurred is through the
conclusion of a raft of regional trade agreements (Kawasaki, 2015, p. 20)
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and China has played both a direct and indirect role in stimulating this pro-
cess (Das, 2014; Kawasaki, 2015). China’s approach to the design of regional
trade agreements has received particular attention (Antkiewicz & Whalley,
2011; Li, Wang, & Whalley, 2017; Song & Yuan, 2012; Zeng, 2016) with the
consensus that its agreements are of low quality in terms of coverage and
liberalization because they are driven largely by political, not economic,
considerations (Antkiewicz & Whalley, 2011; Bergsten, 2007; Kwei, 2013;
Zeng, 2016). As of 2019, China has concluded agreements in the Asia-
Pacific with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Hong
Kong, Macao, Pakistan, Singapore, The Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and
Australia. Each of these agreements incorporates specifically Chinese prefer-
ences in terms of design and, crucially because of the low quality of the ini-
tial agreement, entail substantial subsequent expansion in terms of both
coverage and liberalization (Antkiewicz & Whalley, 2011; Ravenhill, 2010;
Zeng, 2010). Yet whilst the political and strategic implications of these deals
have received a great deal of attention, surprisingly little attention has
been paid to the relation between these economic and political implications
and the dynamic evolution of these deals over time, as if their political impact
is a function only of their original design but not their subsequent expan-
sion and modification. In short, by analysing China’s agreements as a static
‘snapshot’ rather than an on-going process, existing accounts may miss an
important part of the story (Pierson, 2004).
Static approaches are particularly problematic in analysing trade in the
Asia Pacific both because of the rapid pace of change in the region and
because the growth in China’s relative economic power has increased fears
on the part of China’s trade partners regarding the risks of greater integra-
tion with, and increased dependence upon, a large, growing regional
power (Ba, 2014). The situation in the region has become even more fluid
in recent years with the seeming (though perhaps temporary) retreat of the
U.S. from active participation in trade integration in the region due to its
withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in January 2017 (Park, 2017).
At the same time, potential new agreements are on the horizon and are
likely to have significant implications not only for the region, but the global
economic system more generally (Wang, 2011, p. 497). Understanding the
relationship between China’s power trajectory and the implications of its
trade agreements then is all the more pressing today given the uncertain
future of integration in the region.
To explore the relation between China’s power trajectory and its design
of regional trade agreements, I begin by analysing each of China’s agree-
ments in turn and emphasise two elements. First, China has offered gener-
ous up-front terms to a number of its more junior negotiating partners,
despite its clear ex-ante bargaining advantage. Second, it has exhibited a
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preference for narrower, incomplete initial agreements that are progres-
sively expanded over time. In the first section of the paper, I develop a new
framework for understanding the implications of China’s strategy and sug-
gest that its progressive approach to regional trade agreements increases
opportunities for China to maximize its growing bargaining leverage and
regional influence by extending the negotiation of these agreements over
time. In the subsequent section, I establish the regional power dynamics
between China and its trade partners, before moving on to a detailed ana-
lysis of each of China’s regional agreements. I then show how China’s grad-
ual approach contrasts with that adopted by other major regional (but not
rising) economic powers in the region, Japan and the United States, who
have tended to adopt much more comprehensive initial agreements that
require little if any subsequent expansion. This article concludes by drawing
out the implications of China’s approach for the future of the Asia-Pacific.
Dependence, relation-specific investments
and bargaining power
It has long been recognized that agreement design is crucial in determining
the downstream bargaining power of contracting parties both at the domes-
tic and international levels (Coase, 1937; Cooley & Spruyt, 2009; Williamson,
1983). One of the primary purposes of any such formal agreement is to pro-
tect one party against subsequent opportunism or reneging by the other.
This vulnerability becomes particularly acute where one party makes com-
paratively more costly investments in the relationship that cannot be easily
utilised for a different purpose (Williamson, 1983, p. 527). Therefore, any
agreement that induces one party to make such investments presents the
possibility that they can later be exploited unless sufficient safeguards are
included. Such problems are exacerbated further where an agreement leaves
details to be finalized in subsequent negotiations because the specific invest-
ments of one party can be, in effect, taken hostage and used as leverage
when subsequent negotiations take place. Such limited agreements may
arise then because it is advantageous for one party to negotiate at a later
date and the weaker party should therefore fear the increased leverage of
the more powerful at subsequent negotiation stages (Cooley & Spruyt, 2009,
p. 6). Indeed, there is a well-established international relations literature
pointing to the various ways in which vague or incomplete international
agreements and institutions present opportunities for exploitation of the
weak by the strong (Cooley & Spruyt, 2009; Krasner, 1976; Stone, 2011).
Adding to the risks inherent in such bargaining dynamics in relation to
trade agreements is that states can utilise trade as an effective means of
broader political influence. In his classic exploration of this issue, Albert
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Hirschman distinguished between the supply effect of trade and the influ-
ence effect. In discussing the latter, the political influence of one state
upon another resulting from trade, he suggested ‘derives from the fact that
the trade conducted between country A, on the one hand, and countries
B, C, D, etc., on the other, is worth something to B, C, D, etc., and that they
would therefore consent to grant A certain advantages—military, political,
economic—in order to retain the possibility of trading with A.’ (Hirschman,
1945, p. 17). In order for a country to maximize its influence over other
states via trade therefore, it must create a situation in which they would
pay a heavy price in order to maintain the trading relationship. To do so a
state must create a situation in which it is difficult for partners ‘to dispense
entirely with the trade they conduct with [it], or… to replace [it] as a mar-
ket and a source of supply with other countries.’ (Hirschman, 1945, p. 17).
The costs of doing so depends on three primary factors: the value of the
trading relationship to the partner country, the costs of switching or inter-
ruption of the trading relationship, and ‘the strength of the vested interests
which [a country] has created by its trade within the economies of [its
partners]… (Hirschman, 1945, p. 18). In the subsequent discussion, these
factors are explored in relation to China’s growing regional influence and
regional trade partnerships. They are referred to as dependence (measured
by the relative importance of the trading relationship to a country), switch-
ing costs (indicated by the hypothetical ease of transfer of trade with China
to other countries) and political sensitivity (measured by the dependence
of an economically and politically important economic sector on the con-
tinuation of the trading relationship with China). This article utilises the
idea of the influence effect of trade to develop a new framework to explore
the relationship between these factors and the gradualist approach to trade
agreement design adopted by China. Combining these two factors, with
respect to China’s trade policy, the argument is developed that China’s
gradual approach to trade negotiations has negative implications for the
downstream bargaining power of partner states. The strategy of gradual
negotiations allows China to hold out the reward or punishment of subse-
quent agreement expansion or revision and thereby increases its broader
influence more effectively than would an approach that resulted in an ini-
tially comprehensive agreement.
To be more precise, it is suggested that the gradual negotiation of trade
agreements by China leads to two consequences. First, the initial limited
agreement and up-front concessions leads trade partners to make relation-
specific investments which allow them to maximize the benefits of the trad-
ing relationship with Beijing. In line with the literature on this topic, such
investments are defined as relation specific when they arise following a
contractual agreement and would be costly to transfer or re-purpose for
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purposes outside the agreement (Klein, 1980, p. 357; Williamson, 1983,
p. 522). For example, a country that is highly dependent on exporting a par-
ticular good to the Chinese market at a very high volume will find it difficult
to switch elsewhere without incurring substantial costs given the almost
unmatched size of the Chinese market. Investments in such export industries
are consequently treated as relation specific in the subsequent discussion.
The second consequence of the gradual approach adopted by China is that
these initially limited trade agreements induce dependence in China’s trade
partners not only in terms of investments, but more broadly. This depend-
ence can be measured with respect to the relative importance of China to
the trade partner. For example, if China is the destination for 40% of exports
from a partner country, but the partner country is the destination of only 4%
of China’s exports, it can reasonably be said that the export industry of the
partner country is more dependent on the continuation of the relationship
than China. These factors combine to ensure that the bargaining power of
the partner is reduced in future bargaining across a range of issue areas.
Without the gradual approach adopted by China in its negotiations and the
potential to revise or expand the contract subsequently, the utilisation of this
leverage would not be so directly available to China. The gradual approach
to negotiations is therefore important in making it much more difficult for
partner countries to exit from cooperating with China and provides a sub-
stantial reason for maintaining good relations more broadly. Finally, because
of China’s positive power trajectory viz-a-viz its trade partners in the region,
the leverage provided by the initial contract increases over time, which exac-
erbates this dynamic even further and leads eventually to increasingly
unfavourable agreements for junior partners.1 The subsequent empirical ana-
lysis constitutes a plausibility probe of this idea.
Regional power dynamics
That China constitutes a rising power within the Asia-Pacific region, in
terms of its economy and trading position, there can be little doubt. Since
its economic reforms of the early 1980s, China’s GDP has grown at an aver-
age annual rate of over 9.5% and its share of global GDP has increased
from 2.3% in 1980 to over 18% in 2017 (IMF, 2018). By contrast, other major
economies in the region, Japan, Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia have grown
at a respectable but comparatively meagre average rate of around 2%, 6%,
5.5% and 6%, respectively (IMF, 2018). Moreover, since 2010, these average
GDP growth numbers have been 7.8% for China and 1.4%, 3.3%, 5.5% and
5.5% for Japan, Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia, respectively. In short, the
economic gap between China and its major regional competitors and trade
partners has been growing wider, not narrower in recent years.
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In terms of trade too, China has become an increasingly important
economic hub in Asia, with a growing proportion of its imports coming
from its Asian partners and its exports to the region also growing
(Morck & Yeung, 2016, p. 297). China is increasingly the most important
destination for exports from many countries in the region (Blancher &
Rumbaugh, 2004; Tong & Zheng, 2008) and as a result, it presents both
a risk and an opportunity for its regional partners (Ba, 2014, p. 150).
For example, exports from the Association of South East Asian States
(ASEAN) to China increased by almost 140% between 1996 and 2002,
even before a trade agreement between the two parties was concluded.
Between 2001 and 2009 by contrast, ASEAN exports to the U.S. market
declined by 7.5%, and China had become ASEAN’S largest trade partner
and export market by 2010 (Ba, 2014, p. 150). More broadly, China has
become the most important export market for other East Asian econo-
mies whilst its own export dependence on East Asian markets has
declined (Ravenhill, 2006, 2010, p. 5). Exports to China now constitute
an economically important proportion of its regional partners’ total
exports whilst the same is not true for China (Morck & Yeung, 2016,
p. 297). This closer economic integration with regional partners has been
an explicit goal of Chinese foreign policy and since China’s entry into the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 it has pursued an active strategy
of securing trade agreements with its regional partners which form the
foundations of China’s regional influence (McNally, 2007).
What will be the impact on the Asia Pacific as China’s trade policy
evolves in the coming decades? Unlike previous accounts, the purpose in
analysing China’s regional agreements here is not to provide a comprehen-
sive description of China’s foreign trade strategy in the region. Rather the
objective is to think through the consequences of China’s gradualist
approach for China and its regional partners. The article accordingly focuses
on the consequences of China’s design choices, not the motives driving
them. In other words, this article is agnostic on whether the consequences
flowing from China’s approach result from a deliberate strategy or merely a
side effect with important consequences for the bargaining power of its
partners. The subsequent sections explore the interplay between design
and power dynamics by exploring each of China’s agreements in turn, utilis-
ing original analysis of the agreements themselves combined with analyses
provided by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the latest trade data.
China’s regional trade agreements
When it comes to bilateral trade agreements, China is a relative newcomer as
it only concluded its first agreements in 2003. Yet in the last decade, it has
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become much more active in the pursuit of a trade strategy which aims to
strengthen economic relations with major trade partners and emerging mar-
kets (Aggarwal & Urata, 2013; Barfield, 2007, p. 104; Goh, 2014). As a result, it
is today party to 14 bilateral trade agreements, of which 8 are with partners in
Asia or the Pacific. The choice of partners immediately reveals number of pat-
terns – until recently China has tended to target economically minor but polit-
ically significant partners (Pakistan, Hong Kong, Macao, New Zealand and
Singapore), only recently progressing to negotiations with larger economic
powers such as Korea. Beijing divides its trade agreements into two broad cat-
egories, in the first category, with nearby countries, China has adopted the
‘neighbouring country relations strategy’. In the second category are agree-
ments with countries possessed of particular resources and raw materials
required by China, such as Chile or Australia (Barfield, 2007). These categories
are not mutually exclusive and there is overlap in important instances
(Australia is an obvious regional example here).
In many of the negotiations over these agreements, Beijing’s negotiators
have pushed for agreements that are initially narrow, entail limited liberal-
ization and are subsequently expanded over many years in numerous nego-
tiation rounds. Thus, unlike the approach adopted by other major trading
powers, the U.S., Japan, and the EU, China’s agreements differ in their
designs and leave ‘many aspects as the subject of continued negotiations,
and… several omit elaborate dispute resolution procedures’ (Hepburn
et al., 2007, p. 20). China’s agreements also often incorporate few advanced
provisions (such as environmental protections) and often simply reiterate
existing commitments under the WTO. Even the few advanced provisions
that are included in some Chinese trade deals are often vague and
Liberalization of agreements is usually shallow. Dispute mechanism proce-
dures are weak and often not clearly defined either (Salidjanova, 2015, p.
18). The second notable characteristic of China’s approach is the number of
unusual up-front concessions China has provided to its more junior part-
ners. This is borne out particularly with respect to regional deals with
ASEAN and Pakistan, but also in relation to almost all of China’s regional
trade partners where China has liberalized a wider range of goods and serv-
ices over a shorter time period than many of its partners. The next section
outlines these patterns in more detail in relation to each of China’s regional
trade partners.
Agreements with Hong Kong and Macao (2003)
China’s first trade agreements following accession to the WTO in 2001 were
with Hong Kong and Macao, territories with an obvious special significance
given their political status with respect to the mainland. Despite this unique
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status, they remain instructive examples of China’s subsequent approach to
more substantial regional trade deals. The political motivations behind the
Hong Kong and Macao deals were obvious – they allowed China to demon-
strate the benefits of economic integration with the mainland whilst also
safeguarding increasingly closer political and economic ties, but they did so
in an initially limited, piecemeal fashion. In the Hong Kong agreement,
there was a clause that explicitly stipulates further negotiations to extend
the deal at a later stage with the initial agreement only incorporating thir-
teen pages of text which included no explicit dispute resolution procedures
(Antkiewicz & Whalley, 2005, p. 2). In 2004, an expansion of the Hong Kong
deal was agreed, and supplementary agreements have consequently been
negotiated five further times since then, with negotiations taking place in
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 to expand the coverage of the deal.
Further, given Hong Kong’s status as a trading port, the agreement entailed
a ‘one-sided concession’ from China to unilaterally reduce tariffs on imports
to zero by 2006 (Antkiewicz & Whalley, 2005, p. 10). As a result, it has been
said that China gained little economic advantage from the deal as prior to
the agreement only around 20% of goods trade from Hong Kong was tariff
free but after implementation this figure stood at 90% (Hufbauer & Wong,
2005, p. 6). Partially as a result of the agreement, the two economies are
increasingly interdependent and, Hong Kong’s dependence on the PRC had
increased substantially following the deal (Cabrillac, 2004). As of 2018,
China is responsible for over 50% of Hong Kong’s total trade, compared
with 25% in 1997. It is also the source of 46.3% of its imports and the des-
tination of 44.2% of exports (Trade and Industry Department Government
of Hong Kong, 2019). At the same time, Hong Kong’s role as an economic
gateway to China has become less important, as a result of economic liber-
alization in China and the development of competing port cities in the
mainland. The size of Hong Kong’s economy relative to China’s has also
declined due to growth of the Chinese economy (Scobell & Gong, 2016,
p. 3). Similarly, and unsurprisingly, the dependence of Macao has also
grown, as of 2017 China is recipient of 7% of Macao exports (2017) and
35% of imports into Macao come from China (World Bank, 2018d). In short,
in the years since the first agreement was concluded, the economic
dependence of both territories on the mainland has increased dramatically
(DFAT Australian Government, 2018). Given the political and geographic
situation of these two territories, abandoning or substantially modifying the
trading relationship with China is largely precluded and so the costs of
switching to alternative suppliers and markets would be prohibitive in eco-
nomic and political terms. Indeed the growing economic dependence of
each territory has led to the a growing formal and informal influence of
China in Hong Kong and Macao and with it reduced the desire or capacity
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to reduce economic ties with the mainland (Holliday, Ngok, & Yep, 2004;
Yuen, 2014, p. 71). The ability or desire to resist further expansions of the
agreement is therefore also limited. When the agreements entered into
force in 2004, they covered just a few service sectors and the facilitation of
investment. Today the agreements now comprise several supplementary
agreements. For example, the ninth supplementary agreement, signed in
2012 with Hong Kong, expanded the number of service sectors and now
includes education and training and rail transportation (DFAT Australian
Government, 2018). A further supplementary agreement (the tenth) entered
into force in 2014 and this further liberalized trade in services, with a fur-
ther expansion of market access with the mainland. We see in both agree-
ments then a similar pattern, a generous initial agreement that is very
limited in scope, accompanied by a growing dependence of the junior
party which is combined with the gradual expansion of the agreement over
many years.
ASEAN–China FTA (2004)
Arguably the most important regional trade agreement concluded by China
is that with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), a group of
states with a market size of around 630 million people and a collective GDP
of almost 2.5 trillion dollars (ASEAN Secretariat, 2016, p. 1). A framework
agreement between the two parties was finalized in 2002 and an agree-
ment on goods liberalization was signed two years later in 2004. In a third
round of negotiations, a deal covering liberalization in services was con-
cluded in 2007 and then two years later, the parties agreed a deal on
investment (Salidjanova, 2015, p. 8). Since 2007, there have been multiple
rounds of negotiations and expansions of the agreement culminating in
another upgrade of the deal in 2015 despite misgivings of some important
ASEAN members (Xinhua News, 2015).
From the start of the negotiating process, ASEAN states were worried
that their markets would be overwhelmed by more competitively produced
Chinese goods (Ba, 2003). Chinese officials claimed to be attempting to
overcome these concerns by pursuing a policy of generosity, pointing to
the approach of giving a lot whilst receiving little in return (Salidjanova,
2015, p. 8). As evidence of this, China offered concessions to ASEAN in the
form of an ‘Early Harvest Program’ (EHP) which provided protections for the
agricultural sectors in ASEAN countries during implementation of the agree-
ment. It allowed tariffs on around 200 agricultural products to be elimi-
nated by China whilst reciprocal liberalization was not required on the part
of less developed ASEAN members Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam
(Ba, 2003, p. 637). There was also concern for ASEAN that less developed
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members would suffer particular harm from Chinese competition. As a
result, China agreed to extend most favoured nation status to ASEAN’s
newer members and provided them an extra 5 years to comply with the
agreement (Ba, 2003, p. 637).2 This meant that in the early stages of cooper-
ation, these states gained access to China’s market before reciprocal access
was granted. China also agreed to write-off debts owed by these less devel-
oped states to China. These initiatives appear to have had the desired effect
and the EHP was concluded as part of the framework agreement in 2002.
This agreement (perhaps unsurprisingly) is extremely limited. The frame-
work deal included no dispute resolution mechanism but instead contained
a clause which stated the DRM was to be negotiated at a later date. Article
11 of the text of the agreement states:
The Parties shall within 1 year after the date of entry into force of this
Agreement, establish appropriate and formal dispute resolution procedures
and mechanism for the purpose of the agreement. Pending the establishment
of the formal dispute settlement procedures and mechanism under paragraph
1 above, any disputes concerning the interpretation, implementation or
application of this Agreement shall be settled amicably by consultations and/
or mediation. (ASEAN Secretariat, 2002)
The goods deal between China and ASEAN was subsequently concluded
in 2004 and was limited compared to international standards: It allowed
each party to register hundreds of goods on ‘sensitive’ and ‘highly sensitive’
tracks that are not subject to tariff reductions until 2020 and up to 40% of
some states tariff lines can be included in these sensitive categories. Article
6 of the agreement also states that ‘Any Party to this Agreement may, by
negotiation and agreement with any Party to which it has made a conces-
sion under this Agreement, modify or withdraw such concession made
under this Agreement.’ The text also includes a vague exception clauses
such as: ‘nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adop-
tion or enforcement by a Party of measures: (a) necessary to protect public
morals;’ (ASEAN Secretariat, 2006).
Similarly, the services component of the deal, signed in 2007, is limited
in scope, and contains a clause that states ‘At subsequent reviews… the
Parties shall enter into successive rounds of negotiations to negotiate fur-
ther packages of specific commitments under Part III of this Agreement so
as to progressively liberalise trade in services between the Parties.’ In terms
of depth of liberalization too, the services agreement falls well short of simi-
lar EU and U.S. agreements. The liberalization commitments in the services
deal are broken down in to two packages: the first package entail commit-
ments that go beyond existing GATS commitments. However, the parties
also agreed to conclude a ‘second package’ of commitments to improve on
the first within one year. Further negotiations are ‘anticipated to conclude
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further specific commitments on liberalizing trade in services under the
agreement review mechanism’ (WTO, 2015a, p. 10).
The agreement with ASEAN has subsequently been expanded through
an additional agreement on investment, concluded in 2009 but, like the
other components, is itself vague and leaves much to subsequent negotia-
tions. For example, it suggests that a contracting party should not expropri-
ate investments ‘unless for a public purpose’ It also allows exceptions if
‘necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order’. In 2009, a
further memorandum on intellectual property is noteworthy because it con-
tains a clause on dispute resolution which states any disputes ‘will be set-
tled amicably through mutual consultation or negotiation among all
participants through diplomatic channels without reference to any third
party or tribunal’ The potential implications of this, given the distribution of
bargaining power between the two parties, are obvious.
The agreement underwent further expansion in 2010 when the China-
ASEAN free trade area was implemented and a year later in another side
payment, China offered ASEAN members a package of $10 billion credit
plus access to a new $3 billion maritime cooperation fund(Song & Yuan,
2012, p. 113). The effects of the expansion of the FTA in 2010 have been
positive in terms of sheer trade volume, with trade between China and
ASEAN growing to $480 billion in 2014. However, this has come with costs
for ASEAN: its goods trade with China went from a surplus prior to the deal
to a nearly $45 billion deficit in 2013 (Salidjanova, 2015, p. 8). As a result,
businesses in ASEAN’s largest member state, Indonesia, were already
expressing concern prior to implementation of the deal that industries such
as textiles and electronics would be adversely effected (The Economist,
2010). Despite these on-going concerns, a further protocol was signed in
2015 to upgrade the free trade area even further.
Here alongside this gradual expansion, we can also observe an increased
dependence of ASEAN’s largest members on China since the first goods
agreement was concluded: In 2006, China was the fourth most important
destination for Indonesian exports, worth $8.3 billion. By 2017, it had
become the top destination for Indonesia’s goods, with exports worth over
$23 billion, since conclusion of the agreement Indonesia has possessed a
trade deficit with China over many years as a result(Lee, 2015, p. 10).
Similarly, in 2006, China was the fourth most important destination for
Malaysian exports, worth $11.6 billion; by 2017, it was the second most
important destination for exports, worth almost $30 billion (IMF, 2017).
Other ASEAN members have become increasingly dependent on the rela-
tionship with China too because of the kinds of products they import, for
example, Vietnamese manufacturers are dependent on importing Chinese
intermediary products such as machinery, and electronic components. For
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Thailand too, it is highly dependent on importing intermediary products
from China (Lee, 2015, p. 9). Overall by 2015 ASEAN’s trade with China had
increased to three times its value in 2005 (Das, 2017, p. 2) and despite con-
cerns being raised by some ASEAN members, as of September 2017 China,
was calling for the two parties to upgrade the deal still further (Straits
Times, 2017).
From the conclusion of the framework agreement up until the present,
the trade agreement between ASEAN and China has been characterised by
two core elements: The limited nature of the initial agreement combined
with initial generosity on the part of China leading to greater dependence
of ASEAN states. This is followed by successive extension of the agreement
in spite of concerns and deteriorating bargaining power of ASEAN mem-
bers. It is also interesting to note for the future that many of the previous
extensions themselves explicitly incorporate further negotiations and
incorporate a significant number of vague clauses.
Pakistan–China FTA (2006)
China concluded an agreement with Pakistan in 2006 and as with the
ASEAN deal, the outcome of negotiations was a limited initial agreement
on trade in goods that required subsequent expansion. Despite these
extensions to the agreement on services, investment and banking, negotia-
tions are still on-going to extend the agreement further. Notably the con-
tract extensions have been in areas where China has a growing advantage,
particularly in terms of construction and banking services. Despite this, in
recent years further agreement expansion has continued to be discussed
and negotiations continue despite growing objections from many of
Pakistan’s businesses fearful of further exposure to Chinese competition
(Paracha, 2016).
Prior to the agreement, trade between the two countries was largely
concentrated in low-value goods with much less trade in services (WTO,
2008, p. 2). Consequently, it is perhaps understandable that the initial 2006
agreement covered liberalization only in goods, yet even here, tariffs were
eliminated on just 35% of products upon entry into force (WTO, 2008).
Expansion of the goods agreement is built-in to the initial deal and future
liberalization and extension were dependent on subsequent negotiations
under phase II of the agreement. In addition to its low level of coverage in
goods, the initial agreement does not include chapters on competition,
intellectual property rights, or public procurement but does establish a
commission comprising representatives from both parties in order to
expand the deal in these areas at an unspecified later stage (WTO, 2009,
p. 7).
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Perhaps surprisingly, despite the power asymmetry between the negoti-
ating parties, China yet again offered a concession in the form of and Early
Harvest Program in order to support the agriculture sector in Pakistan dur-
ing implementation of the goods deal. Interestingly however, this short-
term benefit for Pakistan has exacerbated the growing asymmetry in
dependence over time given that it has increased trade in these products
between the two countries. Agriculture constitutes just over 20% of
Pakistan’s economy and employs around 43% of the entire labour force
(CIA Factbook, 2017) and in 2006, agricultural products accounted for over
13% of Pakistan’s merchandise exports, whilst for China agricultural prod-
ucts accounted for just 3.4% (WTO, 2008, p. 1).
Alongside the limited scope of the goods agreement there was also
weak liberalization in a number of important goods categories including
textiles and plastics and, as a result, the agreement falls short of the
requirements of GATT article XXIV on eliminating tariffs on substantially all
trade. The omission of textiles was particularly significant since these made
up around 72% of China’s imports from Pakistan but only 7% from China to
Pakistan (WTO, 2008, p. 4). Following the goods agreement, an amending
protocol was added to the contract in October 2008, creating special
‘China-Pakistan investment zones’. This protocol included a clause stating
that the two parties will specifically consider reduction/elimination of tariffs
on goods produced in these zones and consequently further reductions will
be subject to subsequent negotiations and extensions of the agreement
(WTO, 2008). A year after this protocol, and despite the relatively low level
of trade in services between the two countries, the initial agreement was
further expanded to include liberalization in services in 2009. In 2011, a
second phase of talks on further expanding the agreement was initiated.
Following the conclusion of the goods agreement and before the signing
of the services agreement China possessed a large trade surplus in services
with Pakistan (WTO, 2011, p. 3).3 This surplus was concentrated in construc-
tion and transportation sectors in 2008 (WTO, 2011, p. 3). It is important
then that as part of the services agreement Pakistan improved its commit-
ments in these two areas compared to its WTO commitments under the
Generalized Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) whilst Chinese commit-
ments remained unchanged and in line with its existing GATS
commitments(WTO, 2011, p. 9). In the year that the agreement was con-
cluded, construction made up just 0.9% of Pakistan’s trade in services
whereas for China this number was 7.3% (WTO, 2014a, p. 18, 2015b, p. 78).
We see then an initial agreement that favoured Pakistan but over time it
has been expanded in ways more beneficial to China. Over this same period
Pakistan’s dependence on the relationship has been growing. Indeed, all
three elements of a trade policy that maximizes China’s influence are
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present in the relationship with Pakistan. Trade dependence, high switching
costs due to relation specific investments, and domestic sensitivity to
changes in the trade relationship.
The services agreement, as with the deal on goods, is not only limited in
coverage but also explicitly incorporates further extension of the treaty at a
later date, a WTO report summarizes:
Three years after the entry into force of the Agreement, the Free Trade
Commission established under Article 75 of the agreement in goods may
review the Agreement taking into account the developments and
regulations on trade in services of the Parties as well as the progress made
at the WTO and other specialized forums. The Parties may also review and
modify the Agreement when necessary following a request by a Party
(Article 19). (WTO, 2011, p. 16)
The agreement thus sets out further opportunities for direct bargaining
between the two parties even as the power asymmetry and dependence of
Pakistan grows. By 2015, a new banking services protocol was also con-
cluded alongside a large round of memorandums of understanding
between the two parties (Haider, 2015). This is another example where the
agreement has been expanded to the advantage of China given that its
more significant banking and services sectors (WTO, 2011, p. 16). Alongside
these protocols and extensions a further eight rounds of trade negotiations
have occurred under phase II of the agreement, culminating in the most
recent negotiation to upgrade the deal in late 2016 despite Pakistan’s reluc-
tance to further expand the agreement (Haider, 2015). In particular,
Pakistan is holding up negotiations because many domestic producers feel
increasingly unable to compete with their Chinese counterparts (Khan,
2016). As a result, the agreement continues to be highly controversial in
Pakistan as China has recently demanded that Pakistan reduce duties to 0%
on 90% of products under the proposed revised FTA. Indicating the
increased pressure resulting from gradual expansion of the agreement, the
response from Pakistan has been simply that ‘we can’t do it’ (Khan, 2016).
Thus far, under phase I of the agreement, Pakistan has reduced duties to
zero only on 35% of its products, while China has reduced duties to 0% on
40% of Pakistan’s exports, consequently expansion to 90% is a challenge
for Pakistan already struggling to cope with Chinese competition (Khan,
2016). Pakistan has recently requested revision of existing elements of the
treaty because they argue that the agreement itself brings no added advan-
tages compared with countries that have no agreement with China. Yet
China is ‘unwilling to accept Islamabad’s demand for the revival of the pref-
erential treatment for exportable products under the FTA’ (Khan, 2016). In
parallel with this dynamic, we see China becoming an increasingly import-
ant trading partner for Pakistan: Goods exports from Pakistan to China have
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increased from $500 million in 2006 when China was Pakistan’s eighth
most important destination for exports of goods, to $1.4 billion in 2017
when it was its third most important destination for exports for goods.
Exports of goods from China were worth $4.2 billion in 2006 and Pakistan
was the 33rd largest importer, in 2018, this figure was $18 billion but
Pakistan was in 27th place (IMF, 2017). China is the source of almost 7% of
Pakistan’s imports and the destination for around 27% of its exports. Its
next biggest destination for exports is UAE at half that value of (13%).
China takes almost a higher percentage of Pakistan’s exports than its next
four export destinations combined (World Bank, 2018f).Given this, for
Pakistan finding an alternative destination for these exports, whilst not
impossible, would indicate high switching and adjustment costs for domes-
tic producers.
Crucially, despite the reluctance of some in Pakistan, the process of
agreement expansion has continued, and Pakistan possesses limited
options given the high costs of replacing its third largest market. There
have now been eight negotiation rounds under the second phase of the
trade agreement (Financial Express, 2017) with Pakistan continuing to show
‘concern about not being able to get meaningful market access during the
first phase of the FTA’ (Dawn, 2017).
As with the ASEAN deal, an agreement that was initially accompanied
concessions from the rising state has over time had a negative impact on
the economy of the junior partner. Also, similarly to the ASEAN deal, the
value of the initial concessions in agriculture were time limited and now
despite requests to modify the existing agreement from Pakistan, negotia-
tions are ongoing to extend the agreement further. Indeed this dynamic
shows no signs of abating, Pakistan’s economic dependence upon China is
likely to increase in future and consequently it will be less likely to be able
to resist Beijing’s growing bargaining power advantage (Maini, 2018)
New Zealand–China FTA (2008)
Following the Pakistan deal, China signed an agreement with New Zealand,
its first trade deal with an advanced economy, in 2007. At the beginning of
negotiations, China was New Zealand’s fourth largest export market and its
second largest import source whilst New Zealand was China’s 59th largest
destination for exports and 52nd largest import source (WTO, 2010). Today
China is New Zealand’s top trading partner both in terms of exports and
imports. It constitutes the source of over 22% of NZ imports and the destin-
ation for almost 20% of New Zealand’s exports (World Bank, 2018e). The
choice of New Zealand had particular significance for China as it was also
the first advanced economy to recognize China’s status as a market
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economy, which had important implications for China’s position within the
WTO. It has been suggested that the agreement is an exception to the
trend of China concluding limited, politically driven bilateral trade agree-
ments in the region precisely for this reason (Leal-Arcas, 2013, p. 294). The
agreement can in this sense be seen as a reward to New Zealand for this
recognition and stands in notable contrast to the lack of a New
Zealand–U.S. trade deal, despite the best efforts of New Zealand to secure
such an agreement. Nevertheless the agreement with New Zealand remains
limited compared to international standards, and there are no provisions in
the initial agreement on government procurement and no coverage of
behind the border (or Singapore) issues (WTO, 2010, p. 30). During negotia-
tions, New Zealand officials were pushing for broader market access but were
‘rebuffed by the Chinese’ (Salidjanova, 2015, p. 9). However, in relation to the
few areas that are covered, liberalization has been relatively deep compared
to China’s previous agreements and, unlike other agreements signed by
China, the goods and services components were concluded simultaneously
from the start. Despite this however, coverage of services was limited due to
China’s insistence on a positive list approach (whereby only services explicitly
mentioned in the agreement are covered) (WTO, 2010, p. 30).
Following implementation of the agreement, goods exports from New
Zealand to China almost quadrupled since entry into force and China is
now New Zealand’s largest trading partner(MFAT New Zealand, 2018). In
2007, China was New Zealand’s fourth most important destination for
exports worth $1.7 billion. By 2017, China was the top destination for
exports from New Zealand worth $8.4 billion. In 2007, the year before con-
clusion of trade talks China’s exports to New Zealand have gone from
$2.1 billion to $5.1 billion in 2017 with New Zealand going from 56th most
important destination for China’s exports to 50th (IMF, 2017). The initial
agreement induced New Zealand exporters to focus much of their produc-
tion in servicing the Chinese market. This is particularly true in the econom-
ically and politically vital dairy sector, New Zealand’s largest export industry
with respect to China (Kendall, 2014).This sector constitutes around 3.5% of
the country’s GDP, contributing almost $8 billion per year and employing
40,000 workers (Ballingall & Pambudi, 2017). There has also been substantial
investment in the sector in both directions following implementation of the
deal (Whitehead, 2018).
In 2016, both parties agreed to extend the agreement and commence
further negotiations on, among other issues, rules of origin, services, com-
petition policy, e-commerce, agriculture, the environment, and government
procurement. As of June 2018, there have been four further rounds of
negotiation on these issues, but no time frame has been agreed on the
conclusion of these talks. Whilst there have been signs that in recent years
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the Chinese government has utilised its economic leverage to influence the
broader foreign policy in New Zealand, most recently with respect to the
controversy surrounding Huawei, it remains to be seen whether this pattern
will be sustained (Graham-McLay, 2019). In the agreement with New
Zealand then we again observe both increased dependence and relation
specific investments in politically sensitive areas by New Zealand, accompa-
nied by gradual expansion of the agreement.
Singapore–China FTA (2008)
In the same year that the New Zealand deal was concluded, China finalized
its agreement with Singapore. It built on the agreement with ASEAN (of
which Singapore is a member) and it is broader in coverage than some
other agreements signed by China. As with the agreement with New
Zealand, the deal with Singapore covers trade in goods, services and also
incorporates clauses related to rules of origin, trade remedies, sanitary
measures and technical barriers to trade and investment. Despite this, the
agreement covers fewer issues than comparable agreements signed by
Singapore, for example with the United States, Japan or the EU. The
China–Singapore FTA is significantly shorter; it extends to around 75 pages
whereas the U.S agreement is over one and a half thousand pages long. No
notable concessions were offered by either party in the initial negotiations,
though China conceded slightly more in tariff reductions due to the already
high level of liberalization by Singapore as an open trading state. The
agreement entails preferential treatment of around 95% of Singapore’s
exports to China whilst Singapore grants preferential tariff-free treatment to
100% of China’s exports to Singapore (WTO, 2014b, p. 10). The relationship
between Singapore and China does not exhibit the levels of highly asym-
metric dependence as China’s other trade partners because of Singapore’s
global trading position and diversity of other trade partners. Singapore is the
only ASEAN member without a trade deficit with China (Das, 2017, p. 3).
Nevertheless, 10 years after the agreement was signed, China is Singapore’s
primary destination for goods exports, while Singapore is China’s biggest
source of foreign direct investment. China is now Singapore’s top trading
partner in terms of both exports and imports. It is the recipient of over 14%
of Singapore’s exports and the source of over 13% of imports (World Bank,
2018g). A survey found significant investment from domestic producers in
Singapore into China, noting that China was the third largest destination for
overseas production bases by Singaporean companies (Kawai & Wignaraja,
2011, p. 179). In 2015, the parties commenced negotiations to upgrade the
agreement in areas such as services and investment, and in November 2018,
both parties agreed to a further upgrade of the agreement after eight rounds
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of negotiations over three years (Siong, 2018). As with China’s other regional
agreements, both dependence and relation specific investments, along with
gradual expansion of the agreement, are present in the case of the
China–Singapore relationship.
Australia–China FTA (2015)
China’s agreement with Australia, concluded in 2015, took more than a dec-
ade to finalize and the reasons for this slow progress arguably resulted
from China’s gradualist approach. Negotiations between the two countries
consistently stalled due to their inability to agree on the scope of the
agreement. It has been suggested that this was because Australian negotia-
tors wanted a ‘commercially meaningful’ comprehensive agreement with
Chinese negotiators conversely preferring a ‘selective, gradual approach to
trade liberalisation’ rather than a ‘single undertaking’ (Jiang, 2008, p. 182).
Chinese negotiators also argued that so-called ‘behind the border issues’
should not be included in the initial agreement (Jiang, 2008). There was
similarly disagreement over the form of any dispute resolution mechanism
(DRM). Australia had a preference for formalized dispute resolution proce-
dures whereas China preferred ‘bilateral negotiation and friendly consult-
ation, with third-party adjudication as the last resort’. Liberalization of
services in particular was an obstacle to a deal, with Australia pushing for
greater liberalization but China ‘reluctant to liberalize beyond what it
agreed to at WTO accession’ (Jiang, 2008, p. 185). Crucially Australia’s, econ-
omy is interdependent with China’s to a greater extent than any other
developed country, particularly in terms of agricultural products
(Salidjanova, 2015, p. 10). China is now Australia’s largest export market for
goods and largest trade partner overall. Trade with China is now worth
more than Australia’s trade with Japan and the U.S. combined (Chau, 2019).
Further, this dependence on China is concentrated in politically important
sectors, namely, agriculture and energy. China buys more of Australia’s agri-
cultural exports than any other country and by the mid-2010s this was
worth $9 billion to Australia. China is also Australia’s top import destination
for energy-related products and the agreement eliminates all of Chinese
tariffs on Australian these and natural resources (Conifer, 2015).
Whilst crucial for Australia, the trade relationship with Australia on the
other hand does not have a significant impact on China’s growth (Hoa,
2008). Nevertheless, Beijing views Australia as an important regional partner
and has attempted to improve relations. In this way, the Chinese hoped
that the trade agreement would upgrade relations to the level of a new
‘strategic partnership’ (Song & Yuan, 2012, p. 113). When the agreement
was concluded, China was Australia’s top destination for exports, worth
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$60 billion. In 2017, this number was $76 billion, with China remaining the
top destination for Australia’s exports. At the same time, Australia has
remained China’s 14th most important destination for its exports (IMF,
2017). As of April 2017, Australia and China have agreed to hold talks on
upgrading the agreement but no schedule for doing so has yet been
agreed (Xinhua, 2017). Today China is Australia’s top trading partner both
in terms of exports and imports, it is the market for nearly 30% of
Australia’s exports and the source of 21% of Australia’s imports (World
Bank, 2018a). As a result, China is a larger recipient of Australian products
than Japan, South Korea, the United States and India combined. Iron ore
and coal exports to China are worth more than $120 billion and China is
Australia’s biggest customer for these resources too (Chau, 2019). Overall
Australia’s exports to China are worth $144 billion – almost two and a half
times that of Japan, Australia’s next largest export destination (Laurenceson
& Zhou, 2019b). It is estimated that the relationship with China is now
worth around 7% of Australian GDP (Laurenceson & Zhou, 2019a).
In the agreement with Australia, it can be observed again that there is
increasing dependence of the junior partner combined with progressive
attempts to expand an initially limited agreement. In terms of utilising this
leverage more broadly, in 2018, it has been suggested that that the
Chinese government targeted Australian exports of beef, wine, tourism
services and higher education in response to political tensions. In 2019,
there were also reports of Australian coal shipments to China facing delays
at Chinese ports (Laurenceson & Zhou, 2019b). It remains to be seen how
the negotiations between the two countries develop.
Korea–China FTA (2015)
The agreement with Korea, is the largest agreement, in terms of trade
value, concluded by China to date (Wang, 2016b, p. 117). Whilst the agree-
ment is more comprehensive than some of China’s other regional agree-
ments, it again remains a relatively shallow FTA in global terms (Wang,
2016a, p. 418). In addition to covering the same chapters as other Chinese
agreements (trade in goods, services, investment, dispute settlement), the
agreement with Korea also contains new chapters on e-commerce, compe-
tition and environmental standards (Wang, 2016a, p. 418). The agreement is
again notable for its gradual approach to coverage – as part of the deal
subsequent negotiations were scheduled to start within two years after the
entry into force of the agreement. It is not stated in the initial agreement
precisely how other chapters will be negotiated, simply that committees
under the agreement will play a central role. Crucially, the agreement states
that negotiations will be based on new proposals, ‘rather than existing FTA
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provisions’ (Wang, 2016a). Thus whilst the deal with Korea is an improve-
ment in the level of coverage of China’s agreements, it does not seem to
represent a shift away from China’s gradualist approach. The agreement
instead reflects ‘the piecemeal, gradual, and pragmatic approach of China
in upgrading the FTA rules’ (Wang, 2016a).
Upon entry into force of the agreement, Korea and China eliminated
50% and 20% of tariff lines, respectively, and within 10 years 79% and 71%
of tariff lines, respectively (Schott, Jung, & Cimino-Isaacs, 2015, p. 4). Thus,
both countries agreed to liberalize a large proportion of their bilateral
trade, but there are substantial exceptions. For example, unlike similar
agreements between Korea and the U.S., EU or Japan, market access nego-
tiations on services and investment were deferred to subsequent negoti-
ation rounds (Schott et al., 2015, p. 1). As a result, it has been suggested
that the liberalization entailed by the China–Korea agreement is much
more shallow when compared with Korea’s agreements with the EU or U.S.
(Wang, 2016b, p. 146). For example, in Korea’s agreement with the U.S., the
parties agreed to eliminate tariffs on 98.3% and 99.2% of products, respect-
ively, within 10 years. In its agreement with the EU, Korea and the EU
agreed to eliminate tariffs on 93.6% and 99.6% of products within five years
(Schott et al., 2015, p. 5). The agreement with China also fails to establish
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment which is common in Korea’s other
agreements. Consequently, Korea and China simply agreed to ‘consider’
MFN treatment in their subsequent negotiations, scheduled to be held two
years after entry into force of the original agreement. As with China’s other
agreements, the original deal with Korea reflects a positive list approach
but interestingly, subsequent negotiations on services will be conducted
under a negative list approach (similar to that adopted by the U.S. and EU),
which means that all sectors will be liberalized unless specifically stated
otherwise in the agreement (Schott et al., 2015).
The agreement with Korea then, though more detailed than China’s
other agreements, confirms China’s gradualist approach to trade and invest-
ment liberalization, with some exceptions, liberalization in trade and invest-
ment were postponed until the second round of negotiations (Schott et al.,
2015). As a result, the deal with Korea is expected to have relatively a lim-
ited economic impact due to its narrow initial coverage. The final agree-
ment then entails a two-stage negotiation, in which both parties agreed on
the coverage of agricultural liberalization in the first stage and other sec-
tors/issues in the second stage. In agreeing to this sequencing, China
agreed to protect the Korean agricultural sector from liberalization, in
return for excluding Korea’s major export sectors from the agreement
(Schott et al., 2015). Today China is Korea’s largest market for exports with
almost 25% of all exports from Korea destined for China, substantially more
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than both the U.S. and Japan combined. China is also now the largest
source of imports into Korea. Meanwhile Korea is the fourth largest destin-
ation for Chinese exports and the number one source for imports into
China (World Bank, 2018b, 2018c). Alongside this growing interdependence,
China has begun to utilise its economic leverage with Korea in recent years.
When Korea recently installed a U.S. missile defence system, China
responded by implementing policies which led to the closure of a substan-
tial number of Korean owned stores in China and also advised businesses
to stop sending Chinese tourists to Korea (Das, 2017, p. 2). In the case of
Korea then we see a gradual negotiating approach combined with increas-
ing interdependence and the utilisation of the economic relationship for
broader political objectives by China.
China’s agreements in comparative perspective
To understand the ways in which China’s approach to regional trade agree-
ments is exceptional, it is instructive to compare the regional agreements
concluded by other major economic powers in the region, Japan and the
United States. First taking the U.S., its strategy has been to employ a com-
prehensive template when negotiating deals, and as a result its deals cover
issues beyond traditional trade areas, such as e-commerce, the environment
and labour provisions. However, this can create problems in negotiations,
as can be seen in the long-running discussions with Korea that resulted in
delayed implementation of the agreement. Similarly, when ASEAN pro-
posed a bilateral agreement, the U.S. signalled ‘that it would not accept a
least-common-denominator approach to accommodate ASEAN laggards’ in
the way that China has done with respect to ASEAN (Feinberg, 2003,
p. 1036). In fact, unlike the asymmetrical concessions, we observe from the
powerful to the junior partners in Chinese negotiations, it has been sug-
gested that ‘Asymmetric reciprocity has characterised US FTAs: trading part-
ners have had to make more concessions (in mercantilist terms) and
remove more trade barriers and investment restrictions’. The U.S. has used
its greater bargaining power to set the negotiating agenda and it has been
‘the champion of comprehensive FTAs, going beyond industrial market
access…’ (Feinberg, 2003, p. 1036)
The other major economic power in the region, Japan has transformed
its approach to regional agreements in recent decades – since 1974, it had
only concluded a few limited bilateral deals, usually with the U.S., specific-
ally related to a small number of products and sectors (Pempel & Urata,
2006, p. 76). Aside from these very narrow agreements, Japan has previ-
ously tended to favour multilateral liberalization and has only engaged in
bilateral and regional trade agreements partially in reaction to China’s
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regional initiatives. Japanese officials feared that Japan’s regional influence
would be reduced if it was unable to develop an FTA strategy of its own,
and of course, trade diversion away from Japan was also a concern follow-
ing the proliferation of regional trade deals (Ahearn, 2005, p. 3).
Maintaining its regional trading position was crucial to Japan not just for
strategic reasons but also because East Asian countries have traditionally
imposed the highest barriers against Japanese exports (Ahearn, 2005, p. 3).
Though Japan’s regional agreements entail a comparatively high level of
liberalization when compared to those of China, exemptions are common.
Japan’s agreement with Singapore for example liberalized only 18.8% of
agricultural products. Elsewhere, studies have demonstrated that Japan’s
agreements result in liberalization of around 94% on imports in terms of
import value, but in terms of tariff lines, it is lower than 90%. It is for this
reason that the Japanese agreements to be less comprehensive (in terms of
liberalization) than those of the U.S but still result in substantially higher lib-
eralization than do China’s agreements. They also tend to cover more issues
than do the majority of China’s regional agreements.
As we have seen, China has also tended to adopt a positive list approach
which means that only those areas explicitly mentioned in the agreement
are covered. This is in contrast to the approach of both Japan and the U.S.,
who tend to both adopt a negative list (where liberalization occurs unless
exemptions are made explicit). In terms of concessions, Japan, like the U.S.,
has offered few if any up-front concessions to its negotiating partners and
has in fact sought to maximize its bargaining leverage as much as possible
by, for example, negotiating with individual members of ASEAN before con-
cluding a deal with the organization overall (in contrast to the approach of
China). Crucially, for Japan, like the U.S. there have been few significant
expansions of its initial agreements.
China’s gradualist approach to trade: implications for the
future of the region
What are the implications of China’s gradual approach to the negotiation of
regional trade agreements for the Asia Pacific? The analysis highlights a
number of important consequences of China’s deals: The first is unsurpris-
ing – as a result of the agreements, China’s junior trade partners have
become more economically dependent on China and as a result, their bar-
gaining power has declined. Trade with China has become a more signifi-
cant proportion of their trade and China has become a much more
important destination for their exports, but the same cannot be said for
China (with the possible partial exception of Korea). Moreover, this trade is
also often in politically sensitive sectors such as agriculture and natural
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resources. In the cases of ASEAN, Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand, this
is a particularly noticeable factor. Such a high percentage of exports from
these countries to China in these sectors means that political sensitive eco-
nomic sectors are now dependent on continuing good relations with China
because finding alternative markets for these goods would be costly. There
is evidence too that China is utilising this dependence to improve its bar-
gaining position over time both with respect to the trade deals themselves
(Pakistan, ASEAN) and over issues beyond trade (New Zealand, Korea and
Australia). China’s up-front concessions have been crucial in inducing some
of its junior partners to conclude a trade deal despite the lack of detail and
the vulnerabilities that come with that (this is most obvious in the case of
ASEAN and Pakistan). These up-front concessions are also important in
accelerating investments and the increased dependence of the partner
country upon the China. The concessions induce them (or more precisely
producers or importers within the partner state) to make investments
because this is often where the highest return and largest market is as a
result of the initial agreement. Indeed, we see situations in trade partners
are reluctant to expand the agreement further, particularly Indonesia and
Pakistan, but China nevertheless pushing for further expansion. We also see
these deals linked to broader political issues, as in the cases of Korea,
Australia and New Zealand. Such power dynamics are not new, but the rela-
tionship between these dynamics and China’s particular approach has not
been sufficiently explored in previous analyses.
Once conclusion of the preceding analysis is that, in evaluating the rela-
tion between China’s approach and power dynamics, a distinction should
be drawn between its increased leverage with respect to the expansion of
the deals themselves (what could be termed internal leverage) versus the
way in which the agreements increase its leverage in issues beyond trade
(external leverage). The cases of Pakistan and ASEAN are good examples of
the former, New Zealand, Australia and Korea are increasingly good exam-
ples of the latter. To illustrate how China’s gradual approach to regional
agreements can increase its internal bargaining leverage we can construct
a simple two period scenario where a more powerful rising state, A, offers
its weaker counterpart, B, generous terms with respect to B’s export of
products to A’s market. These more favourable terms imply that producers
of these products in B re-direct their export of these products to A’s market
to secure superior returns. These producers may change their behaviour in
two ways as a result: first, they can shift production to goods that are in
higher demand in country A or they may create more specialized versions
of products suited primarily to the market of country A. Thus, firms and pro-
ducers in country B are induced to make relation-specific investments as a
result of the initial trade deal. The economic impact that the collapse of an
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existing trade deal would have on country B would be severe and the
domestic political consequences are potentially even more significant –
particularly if the generous terms are directed toward industries that are
politically salient in country B, such as agriculture in ASEAN countries,
Pakistan, New Zealand and Korea. In this way the producers of country B
become hostages to the continuation of the trading relationship between
with A and this reduces the exit options of that country. These investments
then are important in transforming the relationship between the junior
partner and China in allowing the strong, rising partner to gain greater bar-
gaining leverage in future. This dynamic has been neatly summarized else-
where; a trade agreement will alter ‘[The] smaller state’s self-perception of
its own interest: it will converge toward that of the larger. Why? Because
the simple act of participation in the arrangement strengthens those who
benefit from it relative to those who do not.’ (Kirshner, 2003, p. 227).
In selecting between a limited agreement that is subsequently expanded
(as with China) or a comprehensive deal from the very beginning (like the
U.S. or Japan), the most powerful state in a negotiation can decide the best
course of action based on its anticipated relative power trajectory. If the
rewards that result from up-front concessions and subsequent agreement
expansion exceed the benefits of an initially broad agreement, then they
will pursue an initially more limited agreement. If not, they will opt for an
initially comprehensive agreement that locks-in their advantage. The
rewards that derive from subsequent agreement expansion are determined
by the difference between the payoffs of bargaining the first period and
the second period, this is turn is a function of their power trajectory viz-a-
viz their trading partner. Substantively this means that the increased lever-
age derived from gradual agreement expansion is determined by the
change in bargaining power possessed by the strong state from t to
tþ 1… . The figure below illustrates this logic.
In Figure 1, the horizontal line represents the share of all possible gains
resulting from trade cooperation and each vertical line represents a given
Figure 1. Distribution of gains in bilateral trade negotiations between powerful and
weak states.
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distribution. A vertical line at the far right would represent a division such
that all benefits accrue to the stronger state, a line at the far left would sig-
nify all gains accruing to the relatively weak state. For the strong to be
incentivized to pursue a strategy of concession and limited agreements
with subsequent expansion in order to maximize internal leverage, distance
B must exceed distance A. This means that the gains from expansion
exceed the costs of the initial up-front concessions combined with the
value of the foregone gains resulting from the narrower agreement in the
first round. We see evidence for this most strongly in the agreements with
Pakistan and ASEAN. In terms of China’s leverage beyond the negotiation
of the trade agreements themselves, the gradual approach to negotiations
still presents opportunities for China to hold-out the possibility of favour-
able revision or expansion when discussing other bilateral issues. If correct,
this framework suggests that increased dependence on China and progres-
sively expanded deals have one major implication: That (all else equal)
China is going to become increasingly economically and politically domin-
ant in the Asia Pacific and the bargaining power of China’s partners, relative
to China will not only decline but will decline at a faster relative rate
because they will become progressively more dependent on China, provid-
ing China with even greater leverage to extract further concessions over
time. These two dynamics will therefore reinforce each other.
The conclusion presented here that China’s gradual approach to regional
trade agreements increases its leverage should not be read as a refutation
of the importance of economic and political factors driving the selection
and design of these agreements, but rather complementary to them. There
are, of course, important domestic economic actors shaping trade agree-
ment design (Goldstein & Martin, 2000; Hiscox, 2002; Naoi, 2009) and to
these influences should also be added cultural and legal factors driving dif-
ferences in approach between China and others (Peng, 2000; Silbey, 2010).
The aim here is not to deny this but to introduce a more dynamic evalu-
ation of the leverage arising from China’s approach to largely static exist-
ing accounts.
In line with existing accounts, the conclusions outlined here should also
not be interpreted as implying a deliberate grand strategy on the part of
China. Without access to the highest-level policy discussions such a conclu-
sion would be premature. Though decision making power in China is rela-
tively highly centralized, its foreign policy and trade strategy remain the
result of competing domestic and bureaucratic interests. As suggested else-
where, China’s approach is therefore better understood ‘as the selective
application of economic incentives and punishments designed to augment
Beijing’s diplomacy’ (Reilly, 2013, p. 4). The dynamics highlighted here
should be seen then as enhancing our understanding of the incentives
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driving China’s approach to regional trade cooperation. Though further
empirical work is required as the trade relationship between China and its
regional partners develops, the theoretical and empirical discussion of this
paper serves as a useful framework within which to progress this import-
ant discussion.
Notes
1. A treaty is defined as unfavourable here either where it is expanded to include sectors
in which China has an advantage or where the dependence of the partner far
outweighs that of China and this dependence is utilised to exert broader influence.
2. Ba refers to these concessions as ‘sweeteners’.
3. This is in contrast with China’s broader trade in services in the world in which it runs
a deficit.
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